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MR. JUSTICE FELIX FRANKFURTER
1882-1965
Recipient of the
National District Attorneys Association's
1964 Furtherance of Justice Award




At the 1964 Annual Conference of the National District Attorneys Association, held in New York
City in August, 1964, it was hoped that Justice Frankfurter would be able to appear in person to re-
ceive the Association's 1964 Furtherance of Justice Award. Illness, however, prevented his personal
appearance, and Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the United States Court of Appeals of the Second
Circuit Court accepted the award on behalf of Justice Frankfurter. The speech of acceptance that fol-
lows is not only a tribute to a great jurist but it also reflects some thoughts of another distinguished
jurist with respect to the administration of criminal justice-Judge Lumbard himself.-EDIroR.
On behalf of Mr. Justice Frankfurter I accept
for him the Furtherance of Justice Award.
In preparation to be his alter ego I visited him in
Washington on August 11, and he told me what he
would say if he could come here and stand on his
own feet. He was bubbling over with vitality and
ideas; I shall do my best to give his views as he
would wish.
Justice Frankfurter is especially pleased to re-
ceive your award because his life has largely been
concerned with criminal justice. Let me add that it
must be especially pleasing to him that this award
should be given one who served actively on the
Supreme Court for over twenty-three years.
During that time he has been the leading spokes-
man for the balanced view-that the primary
function of law is the protection of society; that
our continuing and principal dilemma is to achieve
that and at the same time give proper recognition
to individual rights.
In 1906 after graduation from Harvard Law
School, Felix Frankfurter returned to New York to
clerk in a law office. Henry L. Stimson had recently
been appointed United States Attorney by Theo-
dore Roosevelt and Felix Frankfurter answered
his call to public service at a reduced salary-re-
duced salaries were one of the rules of the game
then, as now. Stimson had accepted on two condi-
tions: first, a free hand in running the office-no
interlopers from elsewhere to come into the district
to try cases-and, second, a free hand in the selec-
tion of his staff. For his young assistants their
years of federal service were golden years which
set their course for the future.
Justice Frankfurter wanted me to tell you about
the Morse case. In the panic of 1907 the failure of
the Knickerbocker Trust Company and the
National Bank of North America led federal in-
vestigation to the manipulations of Charles W.
Morse-"a Maine man of powerful mentality whose
real difficulty was that he was born I don't know
how many centuries out of his time. He was meant
to be a viking. He was an absolutely ruthless
manipulator." He went into banking to finance his
attempts to corner coastwise shipping and other
operations, and in 1907 many small depositors
faced great losses.
Felix Frankfurter assisted Stimson in the lengthy
grand jury investigation necessitated by Morse's
labyrinthine activities through 70 odd brokerage
houses. After some weeks Stimson received a tele-
gram from Roosevelt saying that he was sending up
Loeb, his private secretary. Loeb told Stimson the
President was greatly concerned because there had
been no action and he was getting many com-
plaints. In short, the President wanted action.
Stimson explained the complications of the investi-
gation and that he had to find out whether a crime
was committed and what action he would be
warranted in recommending to the grand jury, and
as the Justice recites it in his reminiscences, Stim-
son said: "I don't know how long [the investigation]
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will take.... It'll take a good long while. When the
evidence is all in, if it warrants my so advising the
grand jury, I shall advise them to find an indict-
ment .... You tell the President that is the way I
shall proceed, and if that seems too dilatory to
him and he wants other action, then, of course,
it's in his power to remove me and get some other
United States Attorney."
And the Justice comments: "I'll never forget the
excitement in me to hear Mr. Stimson tell the
President what he was going to do."
When Felix Frankfurter told this to Emory
Buckner, who had been with Stimson but had gone
over to the county district attorney's office where
Charles S. Whitman was district attorney, Buckner
told Felix Frankfurter how Whitman had handled
the Triangle Fire case. There had been a loft build-
ing fire in which several hundred young women had
lost their lives when fire broke out and doors
wouldn't open. The question was whether fire
regulations had been disregarded. As Buckner
told it, "Whitman came in this morning mad as
fury, and he called in the head of the homicide
division and said, 'What's happening in the
Triangle case? ."
This was only a few days after the fire. "Well,
boss, we're not finished with the investigation, but
very soon we'll have the case before the grand
jury."
"Well", said Whitman, "Get an indictment! We
can always nol pros it. Here, look at it!" and he
held up an editorial in the Hearst New York
American. "You go and get an indictment. We can
nol pros it if we can't maintain it. You can always
nol pros." and the Justice comments: "Whitman
was getting indictments because Hearst's American
was shouting blue murder!"
Morse was indicted and tried and Felix Frank-
furter's job was to sit in the courtroom and advise
Stimson on the reception and rejection of evidence.
He was instructed to advise when the government
should not put in evidence, when it should not
object to evidence and what was necessary to
keep the record free of error.
Morse was convicted, Felix Frankfurter handled
the case on appeal, and M\1orse served his sentence.
Stimson told his assistant, Frankfurter, that he
would not be a lawyer until he could convince a
jury, and so, as Felix Frankfurter puts it, Stimson
threw him to the wolves. He prosecuted a man
who had been impersonating a federal officer and
cashing a lot of worthless checks, and as Frank-
furter was summing up to the jury he happened to
turn around and there was Stimson in the back of
the courtroom.
After his tour of federal duty Felix Frankfurter
was assigned to defend cases in General Sessions
where serious criminal cases were handled and he
learned about the defense side.
The Justice stressed to me two other features of
service with Stimson: first, there was no reversal of
any conviction secured while Stimson was district
attorney-how many district attorneys could say
this after four years of service in such an office?;
second, when search warrants were executed some
assistant went along with the executing officers to
see that the law was carefully observed.
Then followed work in the War Department as
legal advisor to Stimson, who had become Secre-
tary of War under Taft. Felix Frankfurter worked
on hundreds of legal records and after 1913 worked
with John W. Davis, who had become Solicitor
General after Wilson became President.
The Justice reminded me of what Taft had said
at a Yale Law School commencement in 1905:
"The administration of the criminal law in all the
states in the Union (there may be one or two excep-
tions) is a disgrace to our civilization."
In 1914 Felix Frankfurter returned to Harvard
Law School to teach. For twenty-five years he
badgered and stimulated hundreds of law students
and made them think for themselves. For some
years he taught criminal law but by 1922, when I
entered, he was teaching in other fields. It was my
good fortune to sit under him in administrative
law, and later his generous word to Emory
Buckner helped me to become part of the Stimson-
Buckner-Frankfurter tradition in the United States
Attorney's Office after graduation from law school.
Edward Silver, the able District Attorney for
Kings County, New York [now Surrogate of Kings
County] enjoyed a like fate. There are many men
throughout this country who have moved into
public service directly or indirectly as a result of
Justice Frankfurter's ideas and suggestions.
You will remember the Sacco-Vanzetti case in the
1920s and Professor Frankfurter's passionate in-
volvement in the public controversy which fol-
lowed. His concern was not so much as to whether
Sacco and Vanzetti were guilty of murder; what
disturbed him was the unfairness of their trial and
the questionable procedures followed by the state.
The Justice remarked that some years ago in
reading many volumes of English decisions he was
struck by the fact that he found no reversals of
convictions because of evidence improperly ad-
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mitted; the -very few reversals in criminal cases
were because the judge had misdirected the jury.
Greatly concerned at the complaisance with which
the bar and public in the United States suffered
illegal practices and improper tactics on the part
of the prosecutors, he provoked a law review note
in 1929 which exposed the reckless tactics of Illi-
nois prosecutors who did anything to win convic-
tions and, on appeal, seemed to earn more reversals
than affirmances. But few state prosecutors took
any heed of the fact that the Supreme Court of the
United States had nullified an Arkansas murder
conviction in 1923 because of mob domination and,
in 1936, had nullified a Mississippi murder convic-
tion because a coerced confession had been used.
The Justice asked me to say to you: if state
prosecutors had had Stimson's ideals and prac-
tices, there never would have been any need to
seek federal court interference under the due proc-
ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; resort to
the federal courts would have been forestalled.
It was in 1941, and about Emory Buckner, that
the Justice wrote, "He who wields the instruments
of criminal justice wields the most terrible instru-
ments of government. In order to assure their just
and compassionate use, a prosecutor must have an
almost priestlike attitude toward his duties."
How fortunate for the balanced view of criminal
justice that after his becoming a justice of the
Supreme Court in 1939 his sane views and articu-
late pen were there to cut through to the essentials
and help the Court to steer its often tortuous course
between the Scylla of leaving society without
reasonable protection and the Charybdis of sacri-
ficing individual rights. For example, there is no
better statement of the need to question suspects
and the difficulties of protecting their rights while
being interrogated in the custody of police than
what he wrote for a majority of the Court in
Cidombe v. Connecticut' in June 1961.
He was well aware that appellate judges are far
from the battle and do not always take the full
view. In one of his early opinions, 1942, where he
dissented from the reversal of a fraud conviction,
Glasser v. United States, he took occasion to
warn his colleagues:
"It is a commonplace in the administration
of criminal justice that the actualities of a
long trial are too often given a meretricious
appearance on appeal; the perspective of a
1 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
living trial is lost in the search for error in a
dead record.
' 2
And the next year in Johnson v. United States,3 in
concurring in an affirmance of conviction, he said:
"In reviewing criminal cases, it is particu-
larly important for appellate courts to re-live
the whole trial imaginatively and not to ex-
tract from episodes in isolation abstract ques-
tions of evidence and procedure. To turn a
criminal appeal into a quest for error no more
promotes the ends of justice than to acquiesce
in low standards of criminal prosecution."
How well this puts it!
This view he repeated vainly in 1961 in his dis-
sent in Stewart v. United States4,,. when the
Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction for
the third time.
On the need for speedy justice, he wrote in
Nardone v. United States:
"Dispatch in the trial of criminal cases is
essential in bringing crime to book ......
And in Cobbledick v. United States:
"To be effective, judicial administration
must not be leaden-footed."
6
In the application of new rights a most important
consideration is whether those rights shall be ap-
plied to all cases where they might have been as-
serted in the past or whether the courts need apply
them only to situations arising after the decision
which announces the new right. Justice Frank-
furter saw the great havoc which such rulings
might cause to state criminal justice and it was he
who pointed out that wisdom might well counsel a
cautious and limited application of new principles.
His concurrence in Griffin v. Illinois in 1955 was the
occasion for his expressing these views.7 In that
case the Supreme Court held that Illinois had
violated Griffin's rights in not making available to
him a transcript of the record of his trial and the
Illinois courts were directed to afford Griffin effec-
tive appellate review. Justice Frankfurter pointed
out that there undoubtedly were many indigent
Illinois prisoners who had not been able to appeal
and that, because the Court's ruling created new
law, these prisoners could not be said consciously
to have waived their constitutional rights. He
2 315 U.S. 60, 88 (1942).
3 318 U.S. 189, 202 (1943).
4 366 U.S. 1, 11 (1961).
5 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
6 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
7 351 U.S. 12, 20-26 (1956).
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counseled that the Court should openly limit appli-
cation of its new rule to cases arising after its
decision:
"The Court ought neither to rely on casuis-
tic arguments in denying constitutional claims,
nor deem itself imprisoned within a formal,
abstract dilemma. The judicial choice is not
limited to a new ruling necessarily retrospec-
tive, or to rejection of what the requirements
of equal protection of the laws, as now per-
ceived, require.... In arriving at a new prin-
ciple, the judicial process is not impotent to
define its scope and limits.""
From the great wealth of his opinions I bring
just one more quotation; his concurrence in the
1960 case of Irvin v. Dowd,9 where an Indiana
murder conviction was set aside because the prose-
cutor's statements and broadcasts had made it
impossible to select an impartial jury in the com-
munity:
"More than one student of society has ex-
pressed the view that not the least significant
test of the quality of a civilization is its treat-
ment of those charged with crime, particu-
larly with offenses which arouse the passions
of a community. One of the rightful boasts of
Western civilization is that the State has the
burdeni of establishing guilt solely on the basis
of evidence produced in court and under cir-
cumstances assuring an accused all the safe-
guards of a fair procedure. These rudimentary
conditions for determining guilt are inevitably
wanting in the jury which is to sit in judgment
on a fellow human being comes to its task with
its mind ineradicably poisoned against him.
How can fallible men and women reach a dis-
interested verdict based exclusively on what
they heard in court when, before they entered
the jury box, their minds were saturated by
press and radio for months preceding by
matter designed to establish the guilt of the
accused."10
The Justice said that several years ago in Eng-
land he was discussing crime news with a friend
who was the editor of the London Times. He asked
him whether he would be correct if he said that
there were not two hundred people in London who
knew the name of the Director of Public Prosecu-
8 Ibid. 25.
9 366 U.S. 717 (1960).
10 Ibid. 729.
tions. The editor replied he was sure this was so,
and that he himself did not know his name.
On the fairness of trials, the Justice gave me a
quotation from Macdonell's Historical Trials
about the trial of Michael Servetus, eminent 16th
century physician, lawyer and scholar, who be-
cause of his theological heresies was burned alive at
the stake in Geneva in 1553. Wrote Macdonell:
"There is no accepted test of civilization. It
is not wealth, or the degree of comfort, or the
average duration of life, or the increase of
knowledge. All such tests would be disputed.
In default of any other measure, may it not be
suggested that as good a measure as any is the
degree to which justice is carried out, the de-
gree to which men are sensitive as to wrong-
doing and desirous to right it? If that be the
test, a trial such as that of Servetus is a trial
of the people among whom it takes place, and
his condemnation is theirs also."
And I believe Justice Frankfurter would say
that every criminal trial is a trial of the com-
munity.
Justice Frankfurter brought to criminal cases
not only his sense of the function of criminal law
in society but also the same views of the judicial
process and federalism that permeated all his work
on the Court. He has felt strongly that it is the
duty of a judge to subordinate personal views about
legislation and administrative policies to the dic-
tates of precedent and the law as written by the
law makers. Thus his own strong views against
capital punishment never played any part in his
consideration of cases where the penalty was
death.
In the matter of reviewing state court convic-
tions, Justice Frankfurter felt that the Supreme
Court was exercising a function quite different
from its duty to supervise the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts. He felt that
the Supreme Court should interfere with state
court action only when it clearly passes beyond
what is generally thought to be the limits of de-
cency and fair play. Therefore, while federal re-
quirements for the prompt arraignment of pris-
oners in federal cases should be strictly construed
by the Court (as in McNabb v. United States)," the
states ought to be given some leeway in their ad-
ministration of criminal justice and interpreting
their own requirements of law.
11 318 U.S. 332 (1942).
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Justice Frankfurter's final admonition to prose-
cutors is this: Despite all the increased difficulties
in securing evidence and prosecuting cases, the
only course for the district attorney is to maintain
high standards and to observe the law as laid down
by the courts. This is not an impossible task-it
can be done and it should be done.
You must know from what I have reported and
from my brief account of Justice Frankfurter's
fifty-eight years of concern about criminal justice
how heartening to him is the accolade of the
Furtherance of Justice Award. I have accepted the
award in his name and at his request, but I entrust
this beautiful representation of the award to Ed-
ward Silver, who will have the pleasure as well as
the duty to deliver it to him in person.
In honoring Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whose
flame has burned so steadily and with so bright
and piercing a light for so long, you honor the
highest ideals of the prosecutor and the public
servant, and-indeed-all of those who believe
that only balanced, wise, compassionate and re-
strained enforcement of criminal justice is in keep-
ing with our democratic and egalitarian traditions,
and that in the long run only criminal justice so
administered can be an effective vindication of the
right of society to be secure and the right of the
individual to be fairly treated.
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